0%

Abstract

Against the backdrop of the rising interest in AI security and Web3 security, an increasing number of researchers are shifting their focus to these emerging fields. But as the foundation of internet security, does Web security still hold untapped potential for new discoveries?

Through extensive and in-depth research, I discovered a type of component that has long been overlooked but is widely present across various systems. It plays a central role in modern application architectures, yet is riddled with design and implementation flaws. Once exploited, these vulnerabilities can lead to serious consequences such as privilege escalation, data leakage, and service manipulation.

In this talk, I will take you back to this “forgotten corner” of the system, uncover the hidden security risks behind it, and demonstrate real-world examples of how these vulnerabilities have been exploited in enterprise and cloud vendor environments. Finally, I will discuss how to better identify, defend against, and mitigate these threats through architectural design and security best practices.

Brief biography

Anonymous Researcher

Security Researcher

---

He is an independent security researcher.

Abstract

We will begin by exploring newly discovered 0-click attack surfaces across Android, Samsung, and various Android messengers. First we will walk through the steps required to chain various logic bugs to reach DNG and other image format attack surfaces on Samsung/Android. We will then examine the brief history of logic bugs in these areas, including a few that we discovered and reported to vendors. Next, we will discuss the methodologies we used to discover 16+ vulnerabilities in well trodden image format decoders QuramDNG, QuramJPEG, and DNG-SDK. Finally, we will briefly cover exploitation challenges and methodologies in these areas.

Brief biography

Brendon Tiszka

Google Project Zero

---

Brendon Tiszka is a security researcher on Google's Project Zero team, which aims to reduce harm caused by targeted attacks on the Internet. During his career he has mostly focused on Chrome renderer remote code execution vulnerabilities and sandbox escapes. His current research focus is applying the vulnerability research methodologies he used during Chrome Research to discover vulnerabilities in ubiquitous image decoders such as DNG.

Abstract

Android’s GPU drivers have long been a prime target for attackers — not only due to their historically inconsistent code quality and the powerful primitives their vulnerabilities often expose, but also because they are accessible by default to any untrusted app. In this talk, I will share how I discovered and successfully exploited two Mali GPU vulnerabilities on the Pixel 8a.

I will start with an overview of common Android attack surfaces and prior research, followed by practical techniques for debugging the Android kernel without relying on kgdb. I will then detail the root causes of two vulnerabilities and focus on the exploitation process of one of them, including several uncommon or even novel techniques, such as achieving arbitrary function calls under CFI constraints and using a more elegant approach to bypass SELinux. Finally, I will demonstrate the exploit on a Pixel 8a, obtaining a full root shell.

Brief biography

Chih-Yen Chang (@u1f383)

DEVCORE

---

Chih-Yen Chang, aka Pumpkin, is a security researcher at DEVCORE. His work primarily focuses on Linux kernel, Android and hypervisor security. He is an active kernelCTF player and a multiple-time Pwn2Own participant, where he has successfully compromised targets including Synology NAS, Ubuntu, and RHEL. He recently participated in the zeroday.cloud competition, achieving a successful exploit on the latest Ubuntu Server. He has spoken at conferences such as POC, Hexacon, and HITCON.

Abstract

In the 80s we used to have those mixtapes, where we recorded our favorite songs from various places. Also back in the day, hacking was "easy", buffer overflows were all around, and security in general was still in its very early stages.

In this talk we bring together some of our favorite macOS "Singles", those vulnerabilities that were never released on a themed album (talk). They are often lame simple, bringing vibes of the 80s, but some of them were quite complex giving us modern day challenges.

On the A side of the tape we will listen to Csaba's selection of exploits. We will discuss some AMFI downgrade attacks, were we could simply exploit old vulnerabilities by reintroducing them to the system. Then will divert to exploiting an XPC service in the Compressor app, which was written with anything but security in mind.

Staying with the "Were the developers out of their mind?" theme we will see how we could easily delete SIP protected files, and disable services like XProtect. Finally we will dive into a more complex vulnerability in storagekitd, where we could win a very tiny race and by that fully bypass TCC on the system or simply delete arbitrary SIP protected files.

Now we open the player, flip the tape and listen to Gergely's selection on the B side.

On the B side, I will talk about some of my yet to be discussed bugs. To get things started we'll look at two trivial - yet serious - bugs that should make any vendor blush. One of these is a trivial LPE introduced by a new feature, the other is a hilarious oversight in XProtectRemediator. To get a little more serious technically we will dive into "jetson", an older - but not yet publicly discussed - bug of mine that allowed to fully bypass TCC.

Then comes a newer item from the selection: I will discuss "homeinvasion", a bug in a core macOS feature that only recently got fixed. The bypass for this is still a 0day. Finally I will talk about another rather trivial bug in diskarbitrationd to demonstrate how miniscule mistakes can lead to catastrophe when you're running as root.

Brief biography

Csaba Fitzl (@theevilbit)

Kandji

---

Csaba is a Principal macOS Security Researcher working at Kandji, focusing on vulnerability research and EDR detection development. He currently has over 100 CVEs issued by Apple for vulnerabilities ranging from simple info leaks to full macOS exploit chains bypassing all security controls. He frequently presents his findings on conferences, like BlackHat, Objective By The Sea, POC, and many others. Prior Kandji Csaba worked for OffSec developing the EXP-312 training about macOS exploitation.

Gergely Kalman (@gergely_kalman)

Security Researcher

---

Gergely is a independent security researcher working mainly on the Apple Security Bounty program, with a research focus on logic vulnerabilities. He has presented his findings at OBTSv6, and blogs at gergelykalman.com So far he has found multiple user to root LPEs, multiple TCC bypasses, an app sandbox escape, along with other bugs. He enjoys trying to exploit the unexploitable, as evidenced by multiple bugs of his that were hiding in plain sight for years or in one case, for decades.

Abstract

Microsoft is rolling out their replacement for User Account Control (UAC) to Windows 11 25H2 in the form of Administrator Protection. The goal of this feature is to have all the benefits of UAC but without that pesky lack of a security boundary.

This presentation is about my research into this new feature, its implementation strengths and weaknesses and how I managed to find 9 different ways to get administrator privileges by bypassing the protection. I'll also discuss some related features that have been around since Vista which allowed me to steal your local credentials, hijack protected processes and elevate to SYSTEM.

Brief biography

James Forshaw (@tiraniddo)

Google Project Zero

---

James is a security researcher in Google’s Project Zero. He has been involved with computer hardware and software security for over 10 years looking at a range of different platforms and applications. With a great interest in logical vulnerabilities he’s been listed as the #1 researcher for MSRC, as well as being a Pwn2Own and Microsoft Mitigation Bypass bounty winner. He has spoken at a number of security conferences including Black Hat USA, CanSecWest, Bluehat, HITB, and Infiltrate. He’s also the author of two security books “Windows Security Internals” and “Attacking Network Protocols”, both available from NoStarch Press.

Abstract

After the disclosure of CVE-2025-55182 ("React2Shell") last year, a wave of deserialization vulnerabilities has hit some of the most popular full-stack frameworks. Within a week of React2Shell's initial publication, more than a billion attack attempts were recorded against millions of React apps, shining a light on significant attack surface hidden in plain sight.

But deserialization bugs are only the tip of the iceberg - many other "features" of modern frameworks have quietly shifted trust boundaries and security assumptions in application development.

This presentation explores novel exploit techniques targeting server-side JavaScript that were never possible with simple frontends and JSON APIs. Through live exploit chains, we'll examine how authentication flaws, injection vulnerabilities, DoS, and, of course, RCE can slip through the cracks of web security research. Attendees will leave with a clear understanding of the primitives used to build these exploits and how to weaponize them.

Brief biography

Lachlan Davidson

Carapace

---

Best known for discovering CVE-2025-55182 ("React2Shell"), Lachlan Davidson is an experienced penetration tester and security researcher. In his role as the Security Innovation Lead at Carapace in New Zealand, he's responsible for designing and delivering cutting-edge security assessments, with a particular interest in hacking any systems that are bespoke or unusual.